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Abstract 
We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental 
game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. 
These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and 
the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers’ assignment of decision power and on 
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other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they 
personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the 
manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the 
performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are 
independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive 
than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and 
nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations. 
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1. Introduction 
We present data from experiments in which we study whether people favor their 
friends in a stylized organizational setting and whether this has any effect on the 
behavior of other people involved in the situation. The principal motivation for our 
study stems from the debate on discrimination and favoritism and the assignment of 
responsibilities in family firms, but our work can also be related to other organizational 
forms. Economists have recently been devoting considerable attention to the study of 
family firms, a form of corporate governance which has a sizeable weight in most 
economies (see La Porta, Lopez de Salinas, and Shleifer, 1999). In the work presented 
here we use experiments to shed some light on some of the issues that up to now have 
been studied using exclusively field data.  
A number of previous field data studies focus directly on differences in 
performance between family firms and non-family firms. Perhaps surprisingly the 
empirical evidence is, at this point, mixed. Several papers support the transaction cost 
hypothesis (Pollak, 1985) of no difference in performance, for example Cho (1998), or 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). However, there is also evidence of both more 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2004 and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), and of less 
economic value being created under family firm governance (McConaughy et al., 1998 
and Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
Other studies aim at identifying more specific differences between family and 
non-family firms. One of these differences pertains to issues of equity, distributive 
justice and procedural justice. Greenberg (1990) surveys research on how different 
justice notions interact with interpersonal effects. Van der Hayden et al. (2005) analyze 
these ideas in the specific context of family firms, where personal relations play a key 
role in certain decisions, and refer to the different concepts of distributive justice that 
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play a key role in family firms. Families use need-based justice among its members, 
managers use meritocracy and shareholders use equality. Distributive justice, hence, 
may be difficult to implement in family firms due to the different criteria used between 
agents.  
From a different perspective, Schulze et al. (2001), Burkart et al. (2003), or 
Mork et al. (2004) study how the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is 
modified in family firms. A common theme of these studies is the altruism of the owner 
towards the heir and the possible effects that this attitude may have in alleviating or 
worsening the agency problems. This has been analyzed from a theoretical point of view 
by Chami (2001) and Burkart et al. (2003). Nepotism, defined as favoritism shown or 
patronage granted to relatives, is one possible consequence of this altruism. Similar 
problems may arise in relation to personal friends. 
The consequences of nepotism are somewhat controversial. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) consider that family relationships between owners and managers reduce the 
agency problem. Kang (2000) argues that family-related managers have a deep 
knowledge of the firm that allows them to evaluate risks more adequately and to make 
better strategic decisions. Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) discuss the possible 
positive effects of choosing a family member as a top executive due to higher 
motivation – in the line of stewardship theory.  
Other analysts provide arguments and evidence in favor of the effects of 
nepotism in family firms being negative. Pérez-Gonzalez (forthcoming) analyzes CEO 
successions in family firms using data from 335 management transitions in publicly 
traded U.S. corporations with concentrated ownership of founding family involvement. 
He finds that promotion of CEOs with family ties is indeed frequent. Family CEOs 
attain this position earlier than non family CEOs – on average eight years earlier. This 
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kind of pro-family bias leads to considerable declines in performance, as measured by 
returns on assets and market-to-book ratios. Moreover, this effect is greater when the 
family CEO has not attended a selected business school (a signal of good quality); 
interestingly, this school quality effect is not observed in non-family CEO promotions. 
In the same line Kets de Vries (1993) points to the tolerance of inept family members as 
managers. Schulze et al. (2001) indicate that nepotism may also affect other decisions 
besides CEO succession: promotion to selected places in the organization, better 
remunerations or more training. Kole (1997) and Bates, Jandik and Lehn (1998) find 
evidence of theses practices.  
We will refer to this bias based on family or personal relations that may result in 
the choice of suboptimal managers and to the possible reactions of favored individuals 
as the direct effects of nepotism. However, this may not be all that needs to be 
considered. Nepotism may also have an indirect effect. If a decision based on family 
relations or friendship violates economic or fairness principles, other agents in the 
organization may feel discriminated since they do not benefit from the decision only 
because they do not belong to the insider group. Hence, they may perceive that their 
earnings, positions, status or job security levels are below what they deserve in 
comparison to the insiders. If this perception arises, negative reactions from these 
agents may result. This indirect effect in family firms is discussed in Schulze et al 
(2001) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001). 
Schulze et al. (2001) argue that agency threats of family ownership come 
partially from adverse selection and hold up in non-family top management (also see 
Kets de Vries, 1993). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) claim that these effects may go beyond 
top management to middle management, and may generate shirking behavior. They 
consider that “lower-level managers may resent the implicit immunity top-level 
 5
executives gain from their family status rather than from demonstrated performance” 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Hence, the conflict between meritocracy and nepotism may 
produce unsatisfied workers, who are less motivated to work hard. Miller and Le 
Breton-Miller (2006) point out that a bias in favor of family candidates risks alienating 
other talented managers. 
In this paper we use a simple experimental design to study if, in the presence of 
personal relations between agents, discrimination occurs and whether it leads to poor 
results. The essence of what goes on in the organizational settings we are interested in 
can be captured in a situation in which a decision-maker or manager has to assign 
certain unequal degrees of responsibility or decision power to two different subordinates 
or employees; one of the employees will obtain discretionary power over a larger part of 
a pie than the other. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions 
which affect themselves and the manager.  
We study the impact of two treatment variables. The first is the existence of a 
personal connection between the manager and one of the employees; we compare the 
cases where this connection exists and where it does not exist. The other treatment 
variable is the ratio of productivities of the two employees. In the base case the two 
employees have the same productivity, whereas in the two other cases we look at the 
productivities are different. The resulting design with six treatments makes it possible to 
study the effect of a personal connection between the manager and one of the employees 
for the cases where the employee in question is equally, more or less productive than 
the other employee. 
There are a good number of experiments on organizational behavior issues, 
reflecting the fact that many interesting issues in the area can be nicely studied in the 
kinds of stylized environments commonly used in experimental work. Some recent 
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experimental studies in the area are those of Weber et al. (2001) and Malhotra and 
Murnighan (2002) and Malhotra (2004). One of the things this kind of work has in 
common with ours is that it studies interrelations between the effects of given material 
(extrinsic) incentives and other motivational influences.  
Our research is also related to the literature on social preferences. We will be 
studying an environment in which a person will make a transfer to other persons hoping 
to get something back. The fact that the other players often do return something can be 
explained by notions of reciprocity (Sugden, 1984), fairness (Rabin, 1993) or inequality 
aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000 and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). These models and 
the experiments directly related to them did not take into account the fact that many 
interactions take place between people that know each other personally. However, there 
are some experimental papers which do take into account interpersonal effects like the 
ones we study here. An important general notion in this context is ‘social distance’ as 
discussed in Akerloff (1997) and Hoffman et al. (1996). Bohnet and Frey (1999) show 
that dictator game giving is affected by whether the dictator can simply visually identify 
the recipient and by whether the recipient can identify the dictator. This is consistent 
with the notion that letting subjects see each other, identify each other by names, etc. 
reduces social distance For our purposes we needed preexistent social relations, a 
situation with even less social distance. 
Our treatment configuration makes it possible to study both the direct and indirect 
effects of nepotism. In designing the experiment we have aimed at finding an unbiased 
environment, which a priori does not seem to be specially favorable neither to the 
existence nor the absence of the two effects of nepotism. Our objective was to let the 
data speak for themselves. 
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We find evidence for the direct nepotism effect in that managers tend to favor 
employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other 
employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, nepotism does 
not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these 
effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or 
less productive than the employees who do not know the manager. We also find that the 
joint performance of employees is significantly higher in the presence of personal 
relations, regardless of productivity differences. 
2. Design and Hypotheses 
In our game Player A is given a fixed amount of 10€ that has to be passed on to 
Player B and Player C in fixed proportions. The choice that A has is to give 6€ to B and 
4€ to C or vice versa.1 Player A can be seen as representing the manager of a firm or 
organization who has to assign different levels of responsibility or decision power – 
represented by the different shares of the initial pie - to two of her employees, B and C. 
Once Player A has decided how to assign the two shares, the amount sent to player 
B is multiplied by a factor MB and the amount received by player C is multiplied by MC. 
These factors represent the productivities of the two agents or employees. The 
introduction of these factors allows us to distinguish between responsibility and 
productivity levels. While the shares the employees are assigned by the manager can be 
seen as the responsibility levels, the multiplicative factors can be naturally interpreted as 
the productivities of the two employees. This distinction is important for our analysis 
below. 
                                            
1 The game we use is similar to the game of Brandts et al. (2006) and is also related to the well-known trust game (Berg et. al., 
1995). This kind of games have been used to represent organizational environments like the one we study here. 
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Our design incorporates two treatment variables. The first of them pertains to 
whether the principal personally knows one of the agents or not. In our anonymous 
treatments the game was played in the standard fashion: subjects did not know who the 
others in the trio were. In our friends treatments Player A and Player B knew each other 
personally, but both did not know Player C personally. In turn, Player C did not know 
either Player A or Player B, but did know that Players A and B knew each other 
personally.2 
Apart from varying whether A and B know each other or not, we also vary the 
factors MB and MC. We study 3 different productivity pairs. The first is the case of equal 
productivities, MB=MC=3. The pies that – after the multiplication - the two employees 
have to distribute will be of sizes 18€ and 12€. In the second configuration of 
productivities, player B is a low productivity employee (hereafter we will refer to this 
case as B Low) and the two productivities are MB=2.5 and MC=3.75. In the third case B 
is a high productivity agent (hereafter, B High): MB=3.5 and MC=2.25.3  
The numbers for the B Low and B High cases were selected in a way that keeps 
the total pie size equal to the one in the baseline case of equal productivities at 30€ for 
the case in which B obtains the larger share.4 Given this restriction B and C players can 
not simply exchange the productivities between the two unequal productivities 
treatments. The chosen productivities satisfy the restriction given by the baseline; in 
addition we tried to keep the ratio of productivities as close as possible to the ratio of 
shares. The ration of shares is 1.5, since (High Share)/(Low share)=6/4, while the ratio 
of productivities is MB/MC=3.5/2.25=1.55  for the B High case, and 
MC/MB=3.75/2.25=1.5 for the B Low case. However, remember that the comparisons 
                                            
2 We did not try to control for the degree of personal relation or friendship. Our interest is in nepotism in the wider sense. 
3 The appendix contains the instructions for the case  where player B has the low productivity level, i.e. MB=2.5 and MC=3.75. 
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that we are mainly interested in are the ones corresponding to the friends vs. anonymous 
distinction, so that the above choice of parameters is not crucial. 
Once players B and C have been informed about the amount received they have to 
decide simultaneously and without any communication how much of the pie they 
control they want to give (back) to Player A; we call these amounts xB and xC. The 
payoff for player A is the sum of the amount sent by players B and C. Players B and C 
get, respectively, what they decide to keep for themselves. The straightforward game 
theoretical prediction in this game - if players’ utility functions just incorporate their 
own payoff, the game is played only once and players do not know each other - is that 
both Player B and Player C will give nothing to Player A. Player A is, hence, indifferent 
with respect to how to distribute the initial pie between Player B and Player C. 
Table 1 presents a summary of our treatments. In total we have six different cases 
which arise from the three different productivity configurations of Player B and C and 
the existence or absence of personal relations between player A and Player B. Table 1 
also introduces the acronyms for the different treatments which we will use below. 
Table 1. Summary of Treatments 
PRODUCTIVITIES  
Equal Prod. 
MB=MC 
B Low  
MB<MC 
B High 
MB>MC 
A and B Friends FEQP FBLOW FBHIGH PERSONAL RELATION 
Anonymous AEQP ABLOW ABHIGH 
 
Our simple set-up makes it easy to focus on the precise issues that we want to 
study. We can separately analyze the behavior of players A, B and C and we can study 
                                                                                                                          
4 2.5*6+3.75*4=30 and 3.5*6+2.25*4=30 
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the impact of productivities on behavior. First, we are able to study how player A’s 
assignment decision is influenced by whether she personally knows player B.  
Second, we can study how player B’s decision is influenced by whether he has 
been chosen by an A that knows him. In studying players A and B in the friends 
treatment one has to take into account precisely that they know each other, so that, one 
could say, that the experimental interaction will continue after the experiment itself. In 
particular, the two friends may be able to share payoffs once the experiment is over. We 
will get back to this when discussing the results. 
Third, we can study the reaction of the C player to the existence of a personal 
connection between A and B. For all three cases we will be able to see how the 
influence of personal relations is affected by the productivity differences between B and 
C. Note that the behavior of players A and B pertain to the direct effects of nepotism, 
whereas it is in C’s behavior where we may find indirect effects of nepotism. 
2. 1 The Direct Effects of Nepotism 
The first issue is whether A players will tend to give the larger share of the pie to 
Bs that are friends. This tendency is what we refer to as nepotism. Altruism has been 
argued to be one of the main motives behind the direct effect of nepotism (Chami, 
1999). Most people care more about family members or friends than for others and try 
to help them in the organization. Of course, nepotism may also be influenced by the 
strategic element of expecting to get more back from a friend than from a stranger. Both 
forces can go together since it is possible that the altruism is mutual.  
Note, however, that it is not obvious what to expect. A could suspect that a C 
who is favored vis-à-vis a B friend could be especially generous. In addition, the 
decision could be affected by the difference in productivities. When the friend is the 
more productive of the two employees simple nepotism should bias the A player even 
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more towards giving the larger share to B. Of course, it is also conceivable that more 
general fairness motivations may guide A’s behavior in the opposite direction to 
compensate the C player for his low productivity. It is not easily foreseeable how these 
factors will interact. However, minimal groups’ experiments (see Yamagishi et al. 1998 
for a survey) show that agents send more money to in-group partners because they 
expect more reciprocity from the group members. Hence, this literature suggests that 
discrimination arises as a consequence of expected reciprocity. At this point we posit 
what we call the nepotism-discrimination hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: (Nepotism-Discrimination). Principals in the friends’ treatment will give 
the higher share to their friend, independently of productivity. 
 
The second part of the direct effect of nepotism has to do with whether B will 
react to being favored in a way that is favorable to A. In the experimental literature in 
economics there is considerable evidence of reciprocal behavior in situations like the 
one we study (e. g. Berg et al., 1995, etc), but not on whether this is affected by the 
existence of personal relations. We propose that social distance will affect reciprocal 
behavior. 
Hypothesis 2: (Social distance decreases reciprocal behavior). Friends that obtain the 
higher share will give back more (in percentage) than anonymous players. 
 
 Note that the data could be consistent with only one of the hypotheses. If 
hypothesis 1 were upheld by the data, but hypothesis 2 not, this could be described as 
“thankless friends” not reciprocating the good treatment they receive. If hypothesis 2 
were consistent with the data, but not hypothesis 1, then managers would be getting 
something for nothing from their friends. Both these possibilities did not appear very 
likely a priori, given the ample evidence for reciprocal giving in games like the one we 
study here. 
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2.2. The Indirect Effect of Nepotism 
The idea of workers reacting negatively to nepotism in family firms suggested, 
by Schultz et al. (2001) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) can be supported by several 
theories. Intentionality arguments suggest that if an agent perceives that he is being 
treated unfairly, this may prompt negative reactions (Rabin, 1993).5 The perception of 
unfair treatment can have several origins. Equity theory (Adams, 1965), for example, 
claims that agents value what they obtain with respect to what they contribute. This 
means that agents that perceive that they deserve more than they obtain will become 
angry.  
Social identification can also provide a basis for this negative reaction to 
discrimination based on the membership to social groups. When identification is not 
possible because one person is in a disadvantageous social position, resentment may 
emerge and cooperation will suffer (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Milton and Westphal 
(2005) find evidence of this behavior in work groups. In more general terms, 
‘embeddedness’ (Granovetter, 1985) may be an important factor regulating motivation 
in job situations. Employees with on the job embeddedness will be highly motivated, 
whereas employees with low on the job embeddedness will have low motivation (Lee et 
al. 2004). All these ideas led us to expect a negative reaction to discrimination, as 
captured in hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3: (Discrimination leads to negative reactions). Anonymous agents, when 
they are less favored in the friends’ treatment will give back less than in the anonymous 
treatment when they are less favored. 
 
 It is not self-evident how the differences in productivities will impact on 
behavior. However, the discussions in Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) and Miller and 
                                            
5 There is experimental evidence that negative reactions to unfair treatments exist. See, for example, Brandts and Solà (2001). 
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LeBreton-Miller (2006) suggest that the reaction of the anonymous player will be more 
negative when the manager’s friend is less able than the other employee.  
3. Experimental Procedures 
Our experimental sessions took place at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
between April and October 2005. The sessions were hand-run and involved two large 
class-rooms, which we will refer to as the A and the B/C room. To recruit participants 
we posted announcements at different locations on campus, in which we asked 
interested subjects to sign up in a particular office. We posted separate announcements 
to recruit subjects for the two rooms. The announcements corresponding to the two 
different rooms were posted in different buildings of the university in an attempt to 
minimize prior contact between subjects in the two rooms. At the moment of signing up 
participants were told in which room to gather for the experiment.  
There were small but important differences between the anonymous vs. friends 
sessions, both with respect to what the announcements said and to how the sign-up 
process was conducted. For the anonymous treatments the announcements for the two 
rooms were identical. For the friends treatments the announcements for the A room 
asked for participants that wanted to take part in the experiment in pairs, while the 
announcements for the B/C room were just like those for the anonymous treatments and 
did not make any reference to pairs. 
When signing-up in the office for the anonymous treatment participants simply 
wrote their name on a sheet either for the A room or for the B/C room. We asked a 
certain number of subjects to gather in the B/C room and asked double that number of 
subjects to gather in another classroom, the A room.  
In the friends treatments there was a difference between signing up for the A or 
the B/C room. Signing-up for the B/C room took place in exactly the same way as for 
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the anonymous treatments. In contrast when signing-up for the A room subjects had to 
do it in pairs of people who personally knew each other. More specifically, pairs had to 
write their names at the same time on the inscription sheet for the A room.  
For both treatments, the subjects who gathered in the B/C classroom were 
automatically assigned the role of C. For the subjects that initially gathered in the A 
classroom we used a random procedure to determine who would have the A and who 
the B role. For the anonymous treatment subjects simply drew lottery ticket which 
assigned half of them to the A role and the other half to the B role. For the friends’ 
treatment the assignment of the A and B roles took place as follows. For each pair of 
subjects that had signed up together for the session we separately determined randomly 
who would be A and who would be B.  
Subjects that had been assigned the Player A role stayed in the A room, whereas 
the B players where guided to the B/C classroom. While in the A room the A and B 
roles were being assigned, in the B/C classroom subjects with the role of player C had 
been randomly seated in order on the right side of the room. Once the B players arrived 
there they were seated on the left side of the classroom. In the anonymous treatment 
they were randomly assigned to seats. In the friends treatment the B players were seated 
in an order that facilitated keeping track of the pairings with the A players.  
Then instructions were read aloud, simultaneously in both rooms. After we had 
finished reading the instructions and answered questions, we distributed decision sheets 
to subjects.6 Again, the friends treatments involved a particular feature: the decision 
sheet of each A (B) player showed the name of the B (A) player they were paired with. 
In the anonymous treatments the decision sheets simply showed the identification 
                                            
6 The appendix contains a sample copy of the decision sheets. 
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number of the other two people in the trio. This identification numbers could not be 
tracked by participants to any other individual in the session. 
The A players moved first; they marked their decision – whether to give 6€ to B 
and 4€ to C or vice versa – on their decision sheet. We then marked the decision on the 
corresponding decision sheets of the B and C players in the B/C room. Then the B and 
C players made their decisions and these were communicated to the corresponding A 
players. That was the end of the experimental session; the decisions were one-shot in 
character.  
4. Results 
Table 2 presents the proportions in which players B in our experiment obtain the higher 
share in the different treatments. The pattern is remarkably simple: for all three 
anonymity cells there is a small bias towards B, perhaps just caused by the fact that B 
precedes C in the alphabet. In contrast, in all three friends’ cells there is a similar large 
bias towards B.  
Table 2. Proportions of B getting the higher share 
 FEQP AEQP FBLOW ABLOW FBHIGH ABHIGH 
B 15 12 23 12 26 16 
TOTAL 17 21 25 22 29 29 
PROP. 0.882 0.571 0.92 0.545 0.8965 0.5517 
 
This impression is confirmed by a Chi-square test which compares the differences 
in proportions between the three cases involving friends and the three involving 
anonymous B players; the p-values for the three pair-wise Fischer exact tests are .038, 
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.004 and .003. In short, with respect to hypothesis 1 we find that nepotism exists on the 
side of player A and is the same irrespective of the productivity of the friend.7  
Tables 3 presents the mean returns that player A obtains from player C and Player 
B in those cases in which Player C (who in the treatments with friends is the anonymous 
player) gets the low share and Player B gets the high share. With this data we can 
discuss hypothesis 2 (Social distance decreases reciprocal behavior) and hypothesis 3 
(Discrimination leads to negative reactions). 
 
Table 3: Mean returns from Player C getting the low share, from 
Player B getting the high share, and total return. 
 
  
RET. C LOW RET. B HIGH TOTAL RET. 
ABS. 1.66 7.8 9 
FEQP 
PROP. 0.13 0.43 0.3 
ABS. 1.9047 4.2857 6.1904 
AEQP 
PROP. 0.1587 0.2380 0.2063 
ABS. 2.456 6.1521 8.444 
FBLOW 
PROP. 0.1637 0.4101 0.2801 
ABS. 1.666 3.409 4.511 
ABLOW 
PROP. 0.111 0.1919 0.1458 
ABS. 0.7884 7.7115 8.4827 
FBHIGH 
PROP. 0.0876 0.3672 0.2853 
ABS. 0.4718 4.0312 3.8755 
ABHIGH 
PROP. 0.0524 0.1919 0.1313 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that friends will give back more (in percentage) than 
anonymous players. We observe that the returns from player B are systematically higher 
in the friends’ treatments than in the anonymous treatments. Like the behavior of the A 
                                            
7 Observe that for the Blow case A’s behavior leads to what can be called an inefficient assignment of responsibilities. 
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players, the pattern is quite independent of productivity differences. In treatment FEQP 
this average return is 43%, whereas in AEQP it is 23.8%. Using the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test, this difference is strongly significant (p=0.0002). This result appears also in 
treatments FBLOW and ABLOW. In FBLOW the average return is 41.01% and in 
ABLOW the return from player B is 19.19%, an again strongly significant difference 
(p=0.0023). Finally, in FBHIGH the return from player B is 36.72%, while in ABHIGH 
is 19.19% a significant different at p=0.024. Hence, we conclude that hypothesis 2 is 
confirmed.  
Players A and B that knew each other could conceivably share their money 
payoffs after the experiment; in a way this just reflects how things are in the situations 
that we are trying to represent. However, we think that payoff-sharing can not explain 
away the fact that B players that are friends give back more than strangers. In other 
words we don’t believe that after the experiment the B players in the friends treatments 
asked the corresponding A players to pay them back what these As had obtained during 
the experiment in excess of what the As in the anonymous treatments had obtained. 
Perhaps the B players were asked by their A friends to pay them the rest up to the 50% 
sharing, but our impression is that this did not happen. The B players got away with 
keeping around 60% of the amount to be shared. In general, subjects accepted the 
framing of the situation into which we had put them. 
We now turn to the returns from players of type C when they get the low share. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that players of type C would return a lower amount in those 
treatments where she obtains the low share in a group of friends than in the anonymous 
treatment. Our results show that this is not so and, again, this fact is not affected by 
productivity differences. In FEQP the return is 13%, whereas in AEQP it is 15.87%, 
consistently with this idea, but this difference in not significant at any conventional 
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significance level. In treatment FBLOW the mean return from player C is 16.37%, 
while in ABLOW is 11.11%; the difference is not significantly different. Finally, in 
FBHIGH the mean return from player C is 8.76% and 5.24% in ABHIGH. Once more, 
this difference is not significant. Hence hypothesis 3 is clearly rejected in our design. 
Surprisingly, players of type C do not appear to be bothered by the fact that the other 
player, a friend of player A, gets the high share, even in situations where the friend is a 
low productivity agent.8  
We can now make some additional remarks about the results. Notice first that, as 
an implication of the above results, the total return – shown in the last column of table 3 
- is significantly higher for treatments where friends play, and that this occurs regardless 
of the productivities. In FEQP the total return to player A is 30% versus 20.63% in 
treatment AEQP (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p=0.011). In treatment FBLOW the total return 
amounts to 28.01% of the resources, almost twice as in ABLOW, 14.58% (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum, p=0.0007). Finally, total return in treatment FBHIGH is 28.53% versus 
13.13% in ABHIGH (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p=0.0007). We will get back to this result at 
the end of the next section. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Previous experiments have studied environments in which a truster has to assign 
different degrees of distributive power to one or several trustees, who stand in 
competition to each other. Most of these studies do no analyze whether the 
circumstances under which trustees are assigned to more or less important tasks matter. 
An important behavioral issue may, hence, have been left aside, since people’s 
                                            
8 Overall, we observe that getting the low share seems the most important factor affecting the level of payback by employees, 
whereas being in a group with two friends (that share the biggest amount) does not matter. Moreover, player C behavior does not 
appear to be strongly influenced by the ratio of productivities between herself and player B. 
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motivation in organizational settings may be affected by the circumstances under which 
the assignment to different tasks took place. In the case we study the relevant 
circumstances under which task assignment takes place are the existence of personal 
relations between the truster and one of the trustees. Our focus is on the impact on 
trustees’ behavior of the fact that competition for the higher level of responsibility 
between the trustees and the existence of personal relations may interact. 
We find that, first, given the opportunity to discriminate in a trust relationship 
between a friend and an anonymous player, our subjects discriminate. This 
discrimination occurs independently of the exogenously determined ability of the friend 
with respect to the anonymous player to return trust. Second, we find that friends return 
systematically more than players in anonymous settings facing the same conditions, 
again with no clear effects due to the different productivities induced in treatments. 
Third, anonymous players that interact in a game with two friends and obtain the 
smaller share of the pie (and in this sense are discriminated) do not react lowering their 
return to the principal with respect to analogous situations in a purely anonymous game. 
Fourth, this result is also independent of whether the friend is more or less productive 
than the third player. Fifth, the manager’s total earnings are higher in the case where he 
interacts with B being a friend than when B is an anonymous player. 
With respect to the first and second result what is surprising is their interaction 
with the fourth result. In the connection between As and Bs who know each other 
productivity differences play no important role. Managers favor friends and friends give 
back more than anonymous partners, regardless of relative productivities. 
The third result, the rejection of our hypothesis 3, is surprising by itself. A 
number of ideas can be used to try to rationalize the result. Relative deprivation is 
defined as the individual’s sense of deprivation in comparison with other groups or 
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individuals. Hence, an important question is what groups or individuals are used in this 
comparison (see Akerlof, 1982, 1997). An example would be the documented 
satisfaction levels of women with respect to men, despite different retributions and labor 
conditions. Women expect lower salaries because they live in a chauvinist society; 
hence they experience similar satisfaction levels with lower wages than men. Social 
identity may to help us understand what groups are used in comparisons.  
Tropp & Wright (1999) argue that an individual’s sense of deprivation may 
depend on whether the comparison is perceived to be inter-group or intra-group and the 
level of identification of the person with respect to his own group. They find that in self-
outgroup comparisons, highly identified individuals report more deprivation than 
individuals low in identification” In this sense, Miller (2001) points out that people 
believe that they deserve more respect from other individuals pertaining to the same 
group.  
Moreover, a key issue here may be legitimacy. Tyler (2006) argues that when 
differences between groups are legitimate, people will not perceive bad outcomes as a 
reflection of discrimination. On the contrary, if differences between groups are 
perceived as illegitimate, they may generate anger. This effect has been observed by 
psychologists in experimental research (Brown and Ross, 1978; among others). Applied 
to the case of family firms it suggests that non family members may interpret that 
family members have a legitimate status in the family firm and, hence, they accept 
discrimination. 
Our fifth result can be seen as a kind of bottom line of the whole study. From the 
manager’s point of view it is better to be in an experimental firm with friends. In 
addition, the earnings of the manager are very similar across the three cases with friends 
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(FEQP, FBLOW and FBHIGH). To see how this comes about just compare behavior 
between FBLOW and FBHIGH in table 3. The discriminated C player in FBHIGH 
gives back less in absolute terms and in proportions than in FBLOW. At the same time 
the friend makes a somewhat larger effect when he is unproductive – in FBLOW – than 
in the other case, leading to the overall effect of no effect. 
In our experiment identical material payoffs are to be shared in the absence and 
in the presence of personal relations between two of the subjects. Only in laboratory 
experiments can one arrange conditions to be so tightly parallel. Despite the limitations 
of laboratory experiments we believe that there is considerable value in being able to 
cleanly identify treatment effects. We favor an approach in which laboratory 
experiments, field data from naturally occurring situations and other insights are used 
together to shed light on the phenomena of interest. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE INSTRUCTIONS  
Note to readers: This instructions and decisions sheets refer to the treatment FBLOW, that is, the 
treatment where A and B know each other personally and player B has a low productivity factor in 
comparison to C. We write in italics the appropriate changes for the case of the ABLOW treatment, that 
is, the treatment where all players are anonymous.  
Welcome and thank you for coming today. From now on, we ask you to remain silent. If 
you have any question, raise your hand and an assistant will come to you.  
This session consists of you making decisions that will affect both you and other people 
participating in this session. 
Participation: 
In order to enroll people in this session, we have followed two procedures. In one case 
we have placed announcements in several buildings of this university asking for 
voluntary participation in a research project involving decision making. In the other 
case we placed announcements asking for voluntary participation in a research project 
involving decision making of two-person groups. (This section is missing in the 
treatment ABLOW). 
Development of the session: 
We have constituted groups of three people (in treatment ABLOW we include: 
randomly). In each group, two people enrolled together for this session as explained 
above. Hence, two of the three persons in a group know each other and the other has 
been selected randomly among the participants enrolled individually. (In treatment 
ABLOW, instead of last sentence read: Nobody will know the identity of the people in 
her group.)  
In each group of three people we have three types of participant. A participant of type 
A, a participant of type B, and a participant of type C. Participants of type A are in one 
classroom and participants of type B and C are in another classroom. The participant of 
type A knows personally one of the other members in her group and she will be able to 
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identify her (she knows whether the other is of type B or type C), in the same way that 
this person will be able to identify participant A. (In treatment ABLOW we substitute the 
last sentence by: Assignment of types to participants is random) 
Participant of type A: 
Participant type A will make only one decision. This participant receives a quantity of 
10€ and she must decide to whom she wants to assign 4€ in the group and to whom she 
wants to assign 6€. Once she has made this decision, the amount of money that she 
decided to allocate is multiplied. The amount received by participant of type B in her 
group in multiplied by 2.5 and the amount allocated to participant of type C is 
multiplied by 3.75. Therefore, the amounts that participants of type B and C may 
receive are: 
 
 B receives C receives 
A sends  4€ to B and 6€ to 
C 
10€ (10€=4€*2.5) 22,5€ (22,5€=6€*3.75) 
A sends 6€ to B and 4€ to 
C 
15€ (15€=6€*2.5) 15€ (15€=4€*3.75) 
 
Once the participant of type A will have made her decision, this decision will be 
communicated individually to the members of her group. 
 
Participants of type B and C: 
Participants of type B and C, once the participant of type A in their group has made her 
own decision, also have to make decisions. The participant of type B will receive either 
10€ (4 € assigned by A that are multiplied by 2.5) or 15€ (6 € assigned by A that are 
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multiplied by 2.5). Whatever the amount received, her decision consists in deciding how 
much of the amount she keeps for herself and how much she decides to give to player 
A. For the participant of type C the decision is identical. She will receive either 15€ (4€ 
transferred by A which are multiplied by 3.75), or 22.5€ (6€ transferred by A multiplied 
by 3.75). Once the amount received is known, she must decide how much of the amount 
she keeps for herself and how much she decides to give to player A. Participants of type 
B and C make decisions individually. 
Payments: 
When participants of type B and C will have made their decisions, these decisions will 
be communicated to player A and the session will end. The payments that each of them 
will receive are the following: A will receive the amount that player B will have decided 
to give her plus the amount that player C will have decided to give her. B and C will 
receive the amounts that they have decided to keep for themselves. 
End of the session: 
Once all the decisions will have taken place, you will know the amount that you will 
receive for your participation in the session. You will fill out the receipt you found in 
your folder and we will pay each of you according to the decisions made. 
Once we have paid you, leave the room silently. Thanks for you cooperation. 
On the next page you will find a summary of the decisions for each type of participant 
in each group. Now we will hand out the decision pages on which you will register your 
decisions. 
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SUMMARY OF DECISIONS 
 
 Decision by A: 
Option 1 4€ to B and 6€ to C 
Option 2: 6€ to B and 4€ to C 
 
 
 Decision by B: 
If 15€ (=6€*2,5) Amount she sends to A (she keeps the difference) 
If 10€ (=4€*2,5) Amount she sends to A (she keeps the difference) 
 
Amount received Decision by C: 
If 15€ (=4€*3,75) Amount she sends to A (she keeps the difference) 
If 22,5€ (=6€*3,75) Amount she sends to A (she keeps the difference) 
 
 Payments 
Type of participant Amount in Euros 
A Amount that B sends her + Amounts that C sends her 
If she receives 15:       15 – amount she sends to A 
B 
If she receives 10:       10 - amount she sends to A 
If she receives 15:       15 - amount she sends to A 
C 
If she receives 22,5:     22,5 - amount she sends to A 
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DECISION SHEET 
TYPE OF PARTICIPANT:  A 
The participant of Type B in your group is: [The name of the person she has signed up 
with appears here] 
(In the anonymous treatments the previous sentence is missing) 
Your decision consists of selecting one the options below. Please, mark clearly your 
option.  
Decision by A: 
 
Option 1: 4€ to B and 6€ to C 
 
 
Option 2: 6€ to B and 4€ to C 
 
In the table below we will write down the decisions made by participants of type B and 
C in your group.  
Decisions from B and C 
Amount sent by B:  
Amount sent by C:  
Total amount:  
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DECISION SHEET 
TYPE OF PARTICIPANT:  B 
The participant of Type A in your group is: [The name of the person she has signed up 
with appears here] 
(In the anonymous treatments a participant number appears above) 
We will mark the amount sent to you by A. Once you know the amount sent to you by 
A, and knowing that in your case this amount is multiplied by 2.5, your decision is how 
much you want to send to A and how much you want to keep for yourself. Below you 
can write the amount sent to A. 
Decision by B: 
 
A SENT YOU 4€ 
 Amount to send to A Amount to keep for yourself  
You have 10€ (4€*2,5)   
 
 
A SENT YOU 6€ 
 Amount to send to A Amount to keep for yourself 
You have 15€ (6€*2,5)   
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DECISION SHEET 
TYPE OF PARTICIPANT:  C 
Participants of type A and B in your group know each other personally. 
(In the anonymous treatments a participant number appears above) 
We will mark the amount sent to you by A. Once you know the amount sent to you by 
A, and knowing that in your case this amount is multiplied by 3.75, your decision is 
how much you want to send to A and how much you want to keep for yourself. Below 
you can write the amount sent to A. 
Decision by C: 
 
A SENT YOU 4€ 
 Amount to send to A Amount to keep for yourself 
You have 15€ (4€*3,75)   
 
 
A SENT YOU 6€ 
 Amount to send to A Amount to keep for yourself 
You have 22,5€ 
(6€*3,75) 
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APPENDIX 2: THE RAW DATA 
Treatment FEQ Treatment AEQ 
B C Ret. B  Ret. C Higher B C Ret. B Ret. C Higher 
12 18 2 3 C 18 12 0 2 B 
18 12 8 6 B 18 12 3 2 B 
18 12 7 0 B 18 12 5 2 B 
18 12 6 4 B 12 18 1 3 C 
18 12 8 0 B 18 12 0 0 B 
18 12 6 1 B 12 18 4 3 C 
18 12 6 2 B 18 12 6 0 B 
18 12 6 2 B 18 12 2 6 B 
18 12 8 0 B 12 18 0 8 C 
18 12 9 1 B 12 18 0 6 C 
12 18 4 2 C 12 18 8 3 C 
18 12 9 0 B 18 12 1 1 B 
18 12 9 2 B 18 12 2 0 B 
18 12 9 2 B 12 18 3 6 C 
18 12 8 2 B 12 18 1 8 C 
18 12 9 1 B 18 12 4 2 B 
18 12 9 2 B 12 18 2 8 C 
     18 12 8 2 B 
     12 18 4 6 C 
     18 12 0 0 B 
     18 12 8 0 B 
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Treatment FBLOW Treatment ABLOW 
B C Ret. B  Ret. C Higher B C Ret. B Ret. C Higher 
15 15 5 0 B 15 15 5 0 B 
15 15 6 7 B 10 22.5 0.5 2.5 C 
15 15 7.5 1 B 15 15 2 0 B 
15 15 7 5 B 10 22.5 0 0 C 
15 15 7.5 5 B 10 22.5 0 3.5 C 
15 15 7.5 2 B 15 15 1 2 B 
15 15 7 0 B 15 15 6 5 B 
15 15 7.5 3 B 15 15 4 0 B 
15 15 7.5 0 B 15 15 0 0 B 
15 15 7.5 0 B 10 22.5 0 4 C 
10 22.5 5 1.5 C 15 15 5 0 B 
15 15 5 0 B 10 22.5 0 0 C 
15 15 8 10 B 15 15 0 5 B 
15 15 5 4 B 10 22.5 1.75 7.5 C 
15 15 5 0 B 15 15 4 0 B 
10 22.5 0.1 6.5 C 10 22.5 0 0 C 
15 15 5 0.5 B 10 22.5 0 2.5 C 
15 15 5 0 B 15 15 2 5 B 
15 15 7.5 4 B 10 22.5 0 10 C 
15 15 6 0 B 10 22.5 2 5 C 
15 15 5 0 B 15 15 5 3 B 
15 15 0 5 B 15 15 6 0 B 
15 15 0 0 B      
15 15 15 5 B      
15 15 5 5 B      
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Treatment FBHIGH Treatment ABHIGH 
B C Ret. B  Ret. C Higher B C Ret. B Ret. C Higher 
21 9 11 0 B 14 13.5 4 0 C 
21 9 0 3 B 21 9 1 0 B 
21 9 0 3 B 14 13.5 0 1.5 C 
21 9 10.5 0 B 21 9 1 1 B 
21 9 0 0.5 B 21 9 0 0 B 
21 9 10.5 3 B 21 9 1 0 B 
21 9 10 3 B 21 9 10 0 B 
21 9 0 0 B 14 13.5 0 0 C 
21 9 10 0 B 14 13.5 3 3.5 C 
21 9 10.5 0 B 14 13.5 0 0 C 
21 9 10 0 B 14 13.5 2 3.5 C 
14 13.5 10 3.5 C 14 13.5 0 3.5 C 
21 9 12 0 B 21 9 1 1 B 
21 9 0 1 B 14 13.5 0 4.5 C 
21 9 10.5 1 B 21 9 0 0.5 B 
21 9 10.5 2 B 14 13.5 0 1.5 C 
21 9 10 0 B 21 9 6 0 B 
21 9 10.5 1 B 14 13.5 2 1.5 C 
21 9 10.5 1 B 21 9 0 2 B 
21 9 8.5 0 B 21 9 7 0 B 
21 9 7 0 B 21 9 7 0 B 
21 9 21 0 B 14 13.5 0.5 0.5 C 
21 9 5 0 B 21 9 1 0 B 
21 9 5 2 B 21 9 7 0 B 
14 13.5 8 0 C 14 13.5 1 3.34 C 
21 9 10.5 0 B 21 9 7 0.05 B 
21 9 7 0 B 21 9 5 2 B 
21 9 0 0 B 14 13.5 1 3.5 C 
14 13.5 0 3.5 C 21 9 10.5 1 B 
 
 
